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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-1133 
___________ 
 
JAY L. THOMAS, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.N.J. Civil No. 2-11-cv-03905) 
District Judge:  Honorable William J. Martini 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 1, 2012 
 
Before:  RENDELL, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Opinion filed: March 26, 2012) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant Jay Thomas, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey denying his motions to amend his complaint 
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against Northeastern University and his motions for default judgment.  For the reasons 
that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 Thomas filed a complaint against Northeastern University claiming breach of 
contract and breach of fiduciary duty in connection with his tuition balance.  The District 
Court reviewed Thomas’ complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and dismissed it, 
concluding that he failed to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty and that his breach 
of contract claim did not satisfy the amount in controversy requirement for diversity 
jurisdiction.  We affirmed the judgment of the District Court on appeal.  See
 While his appeal was pending, Thomas filed in District Court two motions for 
leave to amend his complaint and two motions for default judgment.  The District Court 
denied the motions, explaining that Thomas’ appeal of the order dismissing his complaint 
had divested the District Court of jurisdiction.  The District Court ordered that Thomas 
cease filing similar motions pending the resolution of his appeal.  This appeal followed. 
 C.A. No. 11-
3225. 
 As recognized by the District Court, the filing of Thomas’ notice of appeal 
conferred jurisdiction on this Court and divested the District Court of its control over 
those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.  Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount 
Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (per curiam); Venen v. Sweet, 758 F.2d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 
1985).  A lower court may proceed in a case where an appeal is taken from a non-
appealable order, but this exception does not apply here because the order dismissing 
Thomas’ original complaint was appealable.  See Sweet, 758 F.2d at 121. 
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A lower court also has the power pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
4(a)(4) to decide a timely filed motion for reconsideration, see id. at 122, but Thomas’ 
motions, even if they could be construed as motions for reconsideration, were not timely 
filed for purposes of Rule 4(a)(4).  Finally, the District Court had the power to consider 
and deny, or certify to this Court its inclination to grant, a timely motion pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).  See id.
Accordingly, because this appeal does not raise a substantial question, we will 
affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 at 123.  Thomas, however, did not invoke 
Rule 60(b) in seeking to file an amended complaint nor is there any indication he could 
have satisfied Rule 60(b) had his filing been construed as a Rule 60(b) motion.      
1
                                              
1The District Court treated Thomas’ December 7, 2011, filing, styled as a petition for a 
writ of mandamus, as a motion for default judgment.  Thomas was not prejudiced by the 
District Court’s treatment of the filing as a motion for default judgment.  Thomas appears 
to have sought a default judgment on his amended complaint, but, as discussed above, he 
was not given leave to file that complaint.  Thomas filed a mandamus petition in this 
Court seeking the same relief, which was denied.  See C.A. No. 11-4498. 
 
